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Transition to peace leaves children of the Northern Irish
Troubles more vulnerable to suicide
Northern Ireland’s suicide rate has doubled since the Good Friday Agreement. Michael
Tomlinson explains that the toxic mix of greater political stability and increasing social
isolation is putting those born into the Troubles at much greater risk of suicide than their
British or Irish counterparts.
Until recently, the most polit icised public debate about suicide in Northern Ireland was
around the 1981 hunger strikes. While Irish Republicans saw the deaths as tantamount to
‘murder ’, Unionists – the current First Minister Peter Robinson among them – saw the
deaths as ‘self - inf licted’ and a matter of  f ree choice. These deaths were, in f act, classif ied as ‘suicides’
by the Registrar General’s of f ice, a label avoided by the Catholic church at the time.
When public protests around suicide emerged in 2005, the Secretary of  State f or NI was quick to f rame
the issue in terms of  violent conf lict and the need to end paramilitary attacks on young people. This was
completely of f - target. The protesters, community groups f rom North and West Belf ast, were responding
to an ‘epidemic’ of  suicides among young people in their areas, though it took some time f or the of f icial
death registration statistics to record what was going on. A suicide prevention strategy was f inally put in
place in 2006, f our years af ter England and Scotland. By 2010, Northern Ireland’s suicide rate was almost
double what it was in 1998, the year of  the Good Friday Agreement.
From a negligible rate in the 1960s, the suicide rate rose steadily during the 1970s and 1980s, up to a
rate of  10 per 100,000 by 1988, low by international standards. It then f ell slightly over a ten-year period.
But f rom 1998 there is a strong upward trend rising f rom 8.6 per 100,000 of  the population to a rate of
16 per 100,000 by 2010.  Suicide rates f or men went f rom 13 per 100,000 of  the population to 24 per
100,000 by 2008; f or women the increase was f rom a rate of  3.9 to 7.3 over the same period. Northern
Ireland is now in poll posit ion among the jurisdictions on these islands, even ahead of  Scotland. Whereas
the 10-year trend is gently downwards f or the Irish Republic, England, Scotland and Wales, the reverse is
true f or Northern Ireland. Why?
Having examined 45 years of  death registration data and reviewed the suicide trends alongside changes
in violence, polit ics and the economy, we can rule out ‘social constructionist’ explanations in terms of
inf luences on reporting and registration processes. Apart f rom the period 1970-77, there is lit t le evidence
that social processes af f ected the broad reliability of  the data. Nor can we explain the rise in suicides in
terms of  unemployment – f rom 1998 to 2007 the employment rate reached record levels and
unemployment was below the UK average.
What the data show is that men in their late thirt ies up to their early f if t ies are the group contributing
most strongly to the upward suicide trend since 1998. In other words, those born into the conf lict or who
were children during the worst years of  violence are the cohort which now has the highest suicide rates
and the most rapidly increasing rates of  all age groups. For instance by 2010, men aged 35-44 had a
suicide rate of  41 per 100,000 (age standardised) f ollowed closely by 45-54 year olds and the 25-34 age
group. The youngest age group (15-24) which attracts most of  the media attention has a trend line that
has changed very litt le since the late 1970s. Similarly f or women, the weakest upward trend in recent
years has been f or the youngest groups and the strongest f or 45-54 and 55-64 year olds. The overall
gap in rates between men and women has widened in this period.
The rise in suicide rates in the last decade coincides with the move f rom conf lict to peace in Northern
Ireland and is most likely related to it.  The increase can be attributed to a complex range of  social and
psychological f actors. These include the growth in social isolation, poor mental health arising f rom direct
experience of  conf lict, and the greater polit ical stability of  the past decade. Those born and growing up
in the conf lict are the most acculturated to open expressions of  violence, division, authoritarianism and
hatred – they experienced no other polit ical and social context until the late 1990s.  The transit ion to
peace means that cultures of  externalised aggression are no longer socially approved or polit ically
acceptable.  Violence and aggression have become more internalised instead. We seem to have adjusted
to peace by means of  mass medication with anti-depressants, non-prescription drugs and alcohol, the
consumption of  which has risen dramatically in the period of  peace.
Northern Ireland’s suicide prevention strategy has so f ar made litt le impact on the upward trend. It may
well be missing the target by over-emphasizing interventions with younger age groups and f ailing to
f ocus on those occupational groups and communities which experienced the worst of  the violence.
There remains a huge gap between those in psychic pain and support services – almost three-quarters
of  those who succeed in taking their own lives have not been seen by a health prof essional in the last
year. It is cliché to say that mental health is the Cinderella of  the National Health Service but its true. We
spend f ar more on road saf ety than suicide prevention yet more die by suicide than through traf f ic
accidents. Very f ew people realise that about 1,000 more people died by suicide than were killed in the
conf lict yet vast resources were committed to controlling the later. Suicide is a major legacy issue.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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